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1 Introduction
This paper focuses on the labour market e¤ects of international capital mo-
bility. Specically, our aim is to assess whether and to what extent the
remarkable increase in capital mobility experienced by the OECD countries
in the last two decades has contributed to unemployment dynamics.
The benets of capital mobility are well known: the removal of barriers
to factors mobility increases e¢ ciency and, by lowering the cost of nancial
transactions, improves saving and investment both from a quantitative and
qualitative point of view. In the long run, higher capital mobility enhances
capital accumulation and economic growth. However, in a world in which
labour is less mobile than capital, perfect capital mobility will also amplify
the impact of country-specic productivity shocks on domestic employment.
The reason why this happens is easy to understand if one considers how
an economy adjusts to a temporary reduction in productivity. In an econ-
omy without capital mobility, a temporary decrease in productivity leads to
a reduction in the rate of return to capital and then to a temporary fall in
capital accumulation and labour demand. But in presence of low barriers
to international capital mobility, investors diversify country-specic produc-
tivity shocks across countries. As a consequence, when a domestic negative
shock hits the economy, capital ows abroad, where the rates of return are
relatively higher. This further shrinks the demand for labour and deepens
the recession. Conversely, if the shock is positive, the inow of foreign capi-
tal accelerates the increase in the demand for labour. These forces result in
bigger and sharper uctuations in labour demand and real wages than would
be observed in a closed economy, while the mean unemployment rate is not
substantially a¤ected.
In this paper we test the link between capital mobility and unemploy-
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ment dynamics by using a panel of 20 OECD countries for the past 30 years.
In particular, following Azariadis and Pissarides (2003), we are interested in
exploring two possible roles played by capital mobility - rst its e¤ect on
the persistence of unemployment and second its impact on unemployment
responsiveness to idiosyncratic productivity shocks. In our analysis we nd
evidence for both mechanisms: larger penetration of international capital
signicantly amplies the impact of idiosyncratic shocks on domestic unem-
ployment, reduces the duration of the response to the shocks and increases
unemployment volatility.
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present
the theoretical motivations of our study. Section 3 denes the key measures
and concepts of unemployment volatility and capital mobility that we use
in the empirical analysis along with a preliminary analysis of the data. In
section 4 we present the empirical results and simulate the e¤ects of changes
in capital mobility on unemployment volatility. Section 5 concludes.
2 Theoretical motivations and empirical evi-
dence
The importance of international capital mobility has been extensively exam-
ined in the trade theory. However, still little attention has been devoted to
the macroeconomic e¤ects of capital market integration. Indeed, increased
capital mobility can produce undesirable e¤ects in economies whose domestic
capital becomes more responsive to productivity or price shocks.1
1There is a large theoretical and empirical literature which relates changes in the busi-
ness cycle volatility to changes in the degree of capital mobility. On the theoretical side,
the e¤ects of increased capital market integration on macroeconomic volatility are in fact
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A direct implication of increased international capital mobility is an in-
crease in investment volatility as the substitution between domestic and for-
eign investment becomes larger. Using a simple neoclassical model, Razin and
Rose (1994) show that a reduction in barriers to capital mobility enhances
investment opportunities and increases therefore the volatility of investment.
These e¤ects are larger when the underlying shocks are idiosyncratic and
permanent. A non structural empirical analysis is also performed to test the
link between openness and volatility suggested by the theory, nding little
support for the theoretical conclusions.2
Regarding the e¤ects of increasing international capital mobility on the
labour market, Rodrik (1997) is one of the rst who emphasizes the link
between openness and labour market instability in a world where labour is
intrinsically less mobile than capital. The main implication of this asym-
metry is that workers have to face greater instability in earnings and hours
worked in response to country specic shocks when international mobility of
capital increases. Using a simple static model of an open economy, he shows
that the elasticity of demand for domestic labour increases with the degree
of "openness" of the economy.3 The intuition is easy to understand. The de-
not clear, and depend on the nature of the underlying shocks. For a discussion of this
literature, see the survey of Buch (2002). The analysis of the e¤ects of capital market
integration on business cycle volatility goes beyond the scope of this paper. From now on,
we will focus our discussion on the implications of increased capital mobility for labour
market volatility.
2One of the main limitations of this kind of studies is the di¢ culty of design appropriate
measures for the degree of capital mobility. The most frequently used indicators indicate
the existence of barriers to capital mobility but they do not measure the intensity of such
barriers. As a consequence the data (mainly cross sections) are not powerful enough to
deliver any clear-cut implication.
3The degree of "openness" of the economy is captured by the increasing cost incurred
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mand for any factor used in the production process becomes more sensitive to
changes in its own price when other production factors (as for example cap-
ital) respond quicker and to a larger extent to economic changes.4 When an
idiosyncratic shock hits the economy (such as an exogenous shock to labour
demand caused by an unexpected change in labour productivity) a atter
demand curve will result in larger changes in both employment and wages.5
Azariadis and Pissarides (2003) analyse the impact of capital mobility
on unemployment dynamics using a labour search framework.6 Their one-
sector equilibrium life-cycle model combines two important characteristics:
(1) non-Walrasian labour markets with search frictions, and (2) asymme-
try between international mobility of capital and labour, with capital being
perfectly mobile across countries and labour perfectly immobile. In this
framework, unemployment arises in equilibrium because of the presence of
frictions in the matching process between vacancies (opened by rms at a
constant unit cost) and available workers. Temporary international di¤er-
ences in total factor productivity determine the allocation of capital across
national borders and, through capital adjustments, a¤ect the domestic em-
ployment (and unemployment) rate. They show that in an open economy
unemployment uctuations caused by idiosyncratic TFP shocks are larger
though less persistent than in a closed economy. The intuition is the follow-
by rms as capital moves across the national borders.
4As Rodrik pointed out, this can be seen as a direct consequence of the Le Chatelier-
Samuelson principle.
5The distribution of volatility between wages and employment depends on the slope of
the labour supply curve.
6The model is a open-economy version of models previously used to study the impli-
cations of search theory in explaining certain phenomena of the business cycle that the
standard neoclassical framework cannot explain in a satisfactory way. See among the
others Mertz (1995), Andolfatto (1996) and den Haan et al. (1997).
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ing. In a closed economy adjustments of capital stock (and consequently of
employment) after a productivity shock occur gradually and are driven by
changes in domestic savings. In an economy with capital mobility, accumula-
tion and decumulation of capital stock do not occur entirely through changes
in domestic savings. Capital is imported from abroad when a positive TFP
shock hits the domestic economy and is exported abroad in the case of a
negative shock. As a consequence, the adjustment of employment is faster
(instantaneous under extreme assumptions) in an open economy than in a
closed economy. Under quite general assumptions, the main implications for
the unemployment dynamics are that: (1) international capital mobility am-
plies the impact on domestic unemployment of idiosyncratic TFP shocks;
(2) it shortens the duration of the e¤ect; and (3) it raises the volatility of
unemployment. Numerical calibrations of the model show that the variance
of the unemployment rate with perfect capital mobility is almost three time
larger than in an economy without capital mobility. These results appear to
be consistent with the observation that the variability of unemployment has
increased in the last decades in almost all the OECD countries, in parallel
with the liberalization of international capital markets.
An increased labour market volatility in the United States over the last
three decades as been documented in a number of studies. Gottschalk and
Mo¢ tt (1994) show a substantial increase in earnings dispersion in the US
manufacturing sector between the 70s and 80s, half of which has been related
to the increase in the variance of "transitory" movements in earnings.7 The
fact that the change in short-term earning volatility appears to persist along
any dimensions one can cut the data (e.g. skill groups, sectors, establish-
7The increase of the variance of "transitory" or short-term changes in earnings captures
an increase of the uctuations of workers earning from year to year.
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ments) may suggest the presence of a common factor (such has globalization,
but also institutional changes) which have led to greater wage instability
across and within di¤erent groups. Recent evidence in Farber (1996, 2003)
also shows an increase in job insecurity between the 80s and 90s in the United
States. Focusing on the incidence of job loss over the periods 1982-1996 and
1996-2001, Farber nds an increase in job loss rates over time after accounting
for the state of the labour market.8
As Rodrik pointed out, though neither Farber nor Gottschalk and Mo¢ tt
relate the declining job security to the increased integration of international
markets, these facts appear to be consistent with an economy in which greater
openness interacted with uctuations in labour demand has led to greater
instability in wages and employment.
Regarding the e¤ects of "globalisation" on labour demand, as predicted
by Rodrik (1997) and Azariadis and Pissarides (2003), a number of papers
analyse the link between international market integration and labour demand
elasticity.9 Using data for the US manufacturing sector from 1961 to 1991,
Slaughter (2001) nds that production-labour demand becomes more elastic
over time in the overall manufacturing sector and in 5 of the 8 manufac-
turing industries considered. However, when the estimated (time variant)
8In the early 90s (during a weak labour market) job loss rates have been found to be
higher than those recorded during the recession in the early 80s. Job loss also increased
substantially in the 1999-2001 period in concomitance with the beginning of the recession.
9The indicators of international market integration used in the analysis include both
measures of trade and capital openness. In fact the e¤ect of international trade on the
elasticity of labour demand is analogous to that of international capital mobility. The
reason is that rms and consumers can substitute foreign workers for domestic workers
by either investing abroad or by importing goods produced abroad (Rodrik, 1997). As
explained before, higher labour demand elasticity triggers more volatile responses of wages
and employment to any exogenous shocks to labour demand.
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labour demand elasticity is regressed on a number of indicators of the de-
gree of trade liberation, the e¤ect of trade liberalization turns out to be not
robust to the inclusion of time controls, suggesting the presence of a large
unexplained residuals in changes of labour demand elasticities over time.
Following a similar approach, Faini et al. (1999)10 nd some evidence of a
positive e¤ect of globalisation on labour demand elasticity for the manufac-
turing sectors in Italy over the period 1985-1995. Finally, Bruno et al. (2003)
develop a general framework to test the impact of globalisation on labour de-
mand elasticities that generalises the previous empirical contributions. First
a labour demand equation is obtained from the solution of a rms cost min-
imization problem and a trade variable is included in this specication. The
labour demand is then estimated using an industry panel for a number of
OECD countries over the period 1970-1996. The hypothesis that high inter-
national integration a¤ects labour demand elasticity receives strong support
for France and the UK only.
A di¤erent approach is followed in two recent papers by Krishna et al.
(2001) and Fajnzylber and Maloney (2001), which investigate the link be-
tween openness and labour demand elasticities in countries experiencing dra-
matic changes in trade regimes.11 Both papers nd little support to the
conjecture of more-elastic labour demand in response to trade liberalization.
10This paper follows the approach used in a preliminary version of Slaughters study
published in the NBER working paper series in 1997.
11Krishna et al. (2001) analyse the impact of trade liberalization in Turkey where signif-
icant import liberalization measures were announced in December 1983 and implemented
soon after. The 1984 import liberalization program signicantly reduced both tari¤ and
non-tari¤ barriers. Fajnzylber and Maloney (2001) use dynamic panel techniques to es-
timate labor demand relations for manufacturing establishments in Chile, Colombia, and
Mexico across their periods of reforms.
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3 Employment dynamics and capital mobil-
ity: a preliminary analysis
As we have seen in the previous section, the theory predicts that economies
with larger international capital ows have higher volatility of investment
(Razin and Rose, 1994) and unemployment (Azariadis and Pissarides, 2003).
In this section we consider some preliminary evidence of the relationship
between capital mobility and unemployment (and investment) volatility by
looking at the correlation between di¤erent measures of international capital
ows and our variables of interest. The analysis is based on annual data for
20 OECD countries over the period 1970-200112.
We consider three measures of the penetration of foreign capital in the
OECD countries, namely the FDI inows (FDI_in), the absolute value of
FDI inows net of FDI outows (FDI_net), and the sum of FDI inows
and outows as a proxy of the overall FDI activity (FDI_sum). The FDI
ows are normalized by dividing them by domestic investment. The data
on FDI ows are available from the International Financial Statistics of the
IMF for almost all the OECD countries for the period under investigation.13
Measures of capital mobility based on FDI intensity have the advantage that
data on FDI are readily available on a comparable basis for a large number
of countries. However, some limitations remain due to existing divergences
12A full list of the countries included in the analysis and the denition of variables used
is given in Appendix 6.4.
13The IMF publishes annual data on FDI inows (direct investment in the reporting
economy) and FDI outows (direct investment abroad) in the Balance of Payments Sta-
tistics Yearbook, which are also available in the International Financial Statistics.
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Table 1: Capital mobility and volatility of unemployment and investment
rate
FDIin FDIout FDIsum FDInet sd_un sd_inv
1970-2001
sample mean (1) 0.084 0.092 0.177 0.059 0.011 0.072
1970-1985
sample mean (2) 0.033 0.032 0.064 0.029 0.009 0.070
1986-2001
sample mean (3) 0.125 0.138 0.265 0.082 0.013 0.075
sample mean
ratio (3)/(2) 6.721 8.450 5.642 3.936 1.667 1.139
in the compilation methodologies, denitions and classications.14
Following a standard approach in the real business cycle literature, we
calculate the investment and unemployment rates volatility as the standard
deviation of the cyclical component of the time series under investigation. We
detrended the data using the Hodrick-Prescott lter, setting the smoothing
parameter  equal to 100 as suggested for annual data (Hodrick and Prescott,
1997). Raw data on unemployment and investment are available from the
OECD National Account Statistics and Economic Outlook.
Table 1 reports the sample average volatility of unemployment and in-
vestment rates and the average of the previously dened measures of FDI
ows for the whole period (1970-2001) and for two sub-periods, before and
after 1985. The striking feature of the data is the remarkable increase in
international capital mobility after the mid 1980s. The sharp increase in
FDI inows a¤ected almost all the countries in the sample15 and, in accor-
dance with the prediction of the theory, this coincides with an increase in
14For a discussion on the international comparability of FDI statistcs, see the excellent
survey by Falzoni (2000).
15Tables 1A-3A in appendix 6.1 report FDI statistics, unemployment and investment
volatility for individual OECD countries.
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Table 2: Spearman correlation between unemployment/investment volatility
and capital mobility
FDIin FDIsum FDInet
1970-2001
sd_un 0.54** 0.51** 0.52**
sd_inv 0.27* 0.42* 0.46**
1970-1985
sd_un 0.20 0.25 0.38*
sd_inv 0.34 0.03 0.32
1986-2001
sd_un 0.59** 0.61** 0.69**
sd_inv 0.37* 0.43** 0.44**
Notes. **5 percent signicance *10 percent signicance
the volatility of unemployment and investment. On average the standard de-
viation of the unemployment rate is almost 70 percent higher in the period
1986-2001 than in the previous period while the rise in the investment rate
standard deviation is about 15 percentage points.
A preliminary assessment of the cross country correlation between un-
employment and investment volatility and our measures of capital mobility
is provided in Table 2, where the Spearman correlation coe¢ cients are re-
ported for the whole period and for the two sub-periods separately16. The
results show that both unemployment volatility and investment volatility are
strongly positively correlated with all the measures of capital mobility con-
sidered. The rank correlation is not signicant in the period 1970-1985, but
it turns to be strongly signicant in the most recent period.
Finally, Figures 1 and 2 plot each measure of capital mobility against the
volatility of unemployment rate and investment rate respectively. There is a
strong evidence that countries characterized by a higher degree of openness to
international capital ows have higher unemployment and investment volatil-
16Spearman rank correlation coe¢ cients are reported rather then simple correlation
coe¢ cients since the former are less sensitive to the presence of outliers than the latter.
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Figure 3.1: Unemployment volatility and capital mobility 
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Figure 3.2: Investment volatility and capital mobility 
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ity. This relationship holds irrespective of the measure for capital mobility
used. Again the positive correlation is more signicant for the years after
1985, when international capital ows into and out of the OECD countries
recorded a substantial increase.
In what follows we present more systematic evidence of the e¤ects of
capital mobility on unemployment dynamics.
4 Empirical analysis
4.1 Empirical specication
In this section we present econometric evidence of the e¤ects of capital mobil-
ity on unemployment persistence and on the adjustment dynamics of unem-
ployment in response to TFP shocks as predicted by Azariadis and Pissarides
(2003).
The baseline framework is a reduced form dynamic equation for unem-
ployment where we include controls for labour market institutions and the
(ex ante) real interest rate, which may a¤ect the equilibrium rate of un-
employment. We also include a TFP shock, a price shock and an import
shock which may a¤ect the short run dynamics of unemployment17. Among
the institutional variables we consider two indicators of the duration and
generosity of unemployment insurance systems (benet duration and benet
replacement ratio), the tax wedge between the real (monetary) labour cost
faced by the rms and the consumption wage received by the employees and
union density18. Fixed e¤ects for each country, a country specic trend and
17See Layard et al., 1991 and Nickell et al. (2001) for the derivation of the reduced form
for the unemployment equation.
18Data on labour market institutions are taken from Nickell and Nunziata Labour Mar-
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time dummies for each year in the sample are also included.
The baseline unemployment equation is as follows:
uit =
pX
j=1
juit j +
qX
j=0
jtfp_shit j +
0
1instit + 2rintit (1)
+3pr_shit + 4imp_shit + citt+ t + ci + "it
where i = 1; ::; 20, t = 1; :::; 31, tfp_sh is the TFP shock, inst denotes the set
of institutional variables included in the regression, rint is the (ex ante) real
interest rate, pr_sh is an inationary shock and imp_sh is an import price
shock as dened in Nickell et al. (2001). ci and t capture country-specic
e¤ects and time e¤ects respectively and cit reects those country-specic
factors which may have an impact on the change of unemployment. Finally,
"it captures all the other shocks to the unemployment rate, and it is assumed
to be serially uncorrelated.
The inclusion of lagged dependent variables can lead to nite sample bi-
ases with the within-group estimator. The results in Nickell (1981), however,
show that the magnitude of the bias diminishes in the length of the time
series in the panel. Since the sample runs for 31 years, the size of this bias
is likely to be small. The asymptotic unbiasedness of the coe¢ cients cru-
cially depends on the absence of serial correlation in the errors. This will be
investigated by using a serial correlation test described by Baltagi (1995)19.
ket Institutions database. The information is available till 1995. Updated series for the
years after 1995 are obtained from the OECD. Net union density series is updated using
the new data in Visser (2000) and national sources. All the other data are derived from
the OECD National Account Statistics and Economic Outlook. See appendix 6.4 for a
detailed description of the variables and data sources.
19The test is an LM statitistic which tests for an AR(1) and/or an MA(1) structure in
the residuals in a xed-e¤ects model. It is asymptotically distributed as N(0; 1) under the
null. See Baltagi (1995).
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As a measure of persistence we use the sum of the coe¢ cients on the lags
of unemployment, that is  =
pP
j=1
j. For  2 [ 1; 1] the cumulative e¤ect of
a shock on unemployment is given by 1=(1 ). A larger  is then associated
with shocks having a larger cumulative e¤ect on unemployment over time,
implying larger persistence (Pivetta and Reis, 2001).
Following Nickell et al. (2001), the TFP shock (tfp_sh in the equation)
has been measured as the deviation of the Solow residual from its Hodrick-
Prescott ltered trend. The existence of a negative relationship between
the variable shock and the unemployment rate implies that the sum of the
coe¢ cients on the current and lagged variable shock should be negative. We
choose both p and q equal to 2 and 1 respectively, in order to satisfy standard
dynamic properties of the model. In particular, the two lags of the dependent
variable have been chosen in order to obtain serially uncorrelated residuals.
As suggested in the above discussion we are interested in exploring two
possible roles played by capital mobility - rst its e¤ect on unemployment
persistence and second its impact on the responsiveness of unemployment
to an idiosyncratic TFP shock. We thus interact our measures of capital
mobility20 with the lags of unemployment to capture the e¤ect on persistence,
and with the TFP shock (both current and lagged) to capture the e¤ect on
the responsiveness to a productivity shock. We also enter the measures of
capital mobility in levels to control for any possible e¤ect of capital mobility
on the level of unemployment rate. The equation we estimate takes then the
following form:
20In order to smooth out spurious uctuations in capital ows and obtain a more relaible
measure of capital mobility, we use four-year moving avarages of FDI inows and outows.
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uit =
pX
j=1
(j + 
0
jFDImit 1)uit j +
qX
j=0
(j + 
0
jFDImit 1)tfp_shit j(2)
FDImit 1 +0zit + citt+ t + ci + "it
where m = IN; SUM;NET , and zit21 denotes a set of other controls as in
equation 1. We use lagged rather than current values of FDI ows in order to
avoid endogeneity arising from potential correlation between the error term
and current FDI ows caused, for example, by unexpected aggregate shocks
on employment22.
The measure of persistence now becomes  =
pP
j=1
(j + 
0
jFDIm). If we
expect that capital mobility reduces unemployment persistence, the null hy-
pothesis we want to test is H0 :
pP
j=1
0j = 0 versus H1 :
pP
j=1
0j < 0. If the
null is rejected, we can conclude that higher capital mobility leads to a lower
persistence of unemployment.
Similarly, capital mobility increases the responsiveness of unemployment
to a TFP shock if the sum of the coe¢ cients on the variable shock interacted
with our proxies for capital mobility is signicantly lower than zero. Formally,
H0 :
qP
j=0
0j = 0 versus H1 :
qP
j=0
0j < 0
23.
21zit = (unionit; bdit; brrit; twit; rintit; pr_shit; imp_shit)
22We obtain very similar results when the current value of FDI ows rather than the
lagged one is used in the regressions.
23Given that the coe¢ cient on the interaction term is always negative on both the
current and lagged shock (and then the sum of the two coe¢ cients turns to be always
signicantly less then zero), to save space the t-statistic and p-value of the null hypotesis
H0 :
qP
j=0
0j > 0 are not reported in the tables with the empirical results.
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4.2 Empirical results
We begin in Table 3 by showing estimates of the coe¢ cients of a baseline
model with no interactions with TFP shocks. The estimates are reported for
the whole sample and for the small countries only, in order to check whether
there are signicant di¤erences in the impact of capital mobility related to
the size of the countries considered.24
In columns (1), (2) and (3) the lags of unemployment are interacted with
the net FDI inows, the sum of FDI inows and outows and FDI inows
respectively. Capital mobility reduces the coe¢ cient on the rst lag of un-
employment and increases the coe¢ cient on the second lag. The net e¤ect
on persistence (the sum of the two coe¢ cients) is negative and signicant as
revealed by the t-test reported at the bottom of the table.25 This result is
robust to two of the three measures for capital mobility considered, namely
FDIsum and FDIin, and it holds for both the whole sample and the small
countries sample. When we consider the net FDI inows, the coe¢ cients on
the interactions have still the expected sign, their sum is negative and mar-
ginally signicant, though they are not individually nor jointly signicant.
There is no evidence of any e¤ects of capital mobility on the level of un-
employment. All the other controls behave as predicted by the theory with
union density, benet duration and tax wedge having a positive a signicant
impact on unemployment. Real interest rate is well signed and signicant as
well. As expected, both the current and lagged TFP shocks have a negative
and signicant e¤ect on the unemployment rate.
24The small countries sample is obtained by excluding all the G7 countries with the
exception of Canada.
25The t-statistic and p-value of the null hypotesis H0 :
pP
j=1
0j > 0 are reported on the
lower panel of Table 3.
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Table 3: Capital mobility and unemployment persistence (whole period)
uit Whole Countries Small Countries
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
uit 1 1.301 1.360 1.343 1.301 1.357 1.351
(21.35) (26.23) (23.53) (18.28) (22.97) (20.60)
uit 2 -0.498 -0.552 -0.536 -0.509 -0.566 -0.559
(8.57) (10.79) (10.04) (7.45) (10.00) (9.36)
uit 1  FDImit 1 0.150 -0.330 -0.372 0.041 -0.341 -0.541
(0.19) (3.18) (0.96) (0.05) (3.33) (1.29)
uit 2  FDImit 1 -0.412 0.222 0.134 -0.351 0.233 0.274
(0.57) (1.86) (0.40) (0.43) (1.82) (0.77)
FDInetit 1 0.004 0.012
(0.20) (0.52)
FDIsumit 1 -0.004 0.004
(0.70) (0.60)
FDIinit 1 0.018 0.016
(1.63) (1.32)
FDIoutit 1 -0.002 -0.001
(1.33) (0.41)
unionit 0.036 0.039 0.039 0.036 0.040 0.039
(2.94) (3.22) (3.22) (2.68) (2.88) (2.88)
bdit 0.007 0.008 0.007 0.011 0.010 0.011
(1.65) (1.72) (1.66) (2.01) (2.00) (2.04)
brrit -0.001 -0.002 0.000 -0.007 -0.007 -0.005
(0.12) (0.22) (0.01) (0.59) (0.65) (0.64)
twit 0.027 0.027 0.029 0.045 0.046 0.469
(2.02) (2.04) (2.14) (2.23) (2.76) (2.77)
rintit 0.043 0.041 0.040 0.051 0.050 -0.048
(2.20) (2.08) (2.05) (2.23) (2.19) (2.10)
pr_shit 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.006 0.004 0.004
(0.29) (0.16) (0.22) (0.42) (0.31) (0.30)
imp_shit 0.005 0.011 0.015 0.017 0.021 0.025
(0.20) (0.43) (0.53) (0.55) (0.71) (0.82)
tfp_shit -0.041 -0.043 -0.042 -0.030 -0.033 -0.032
(2.45) (2.66) (2.55) (1.17) (4.97) (1.83)
tfp_shit 1 -0.091 -0.089 -0.090 -0.085 -0.083 -0.083
(5.83) (5.79) (5.89) (5.01) (4.97) (5.06)
Serial Corr (p-value) 0.29 0.25 0.19 0.15 0.31 0.12
Obs. 544 544 544 372 372 372
Fixed e¤ects 20 20 20 14 14 14
F-tests (p-values):
H0 : 1 = 0; 2 = 0 0.43 0.00 0.12 0.47 0.00 0.06
H0 : 1 + 2 = 0 0.14 0.02 0.05 0.13 0.04 0.25
Notes. Robust t-statistics in parenthesis. Serial Correlation is an LM test distributed
N(0,1) under the null (H0: no autocorrelation). In columns (1), (2) and (3) the lags of
the unemployment rate are interacted with FDInet, FDIsum and FDIin respectively.
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Next we investigate the role that capital mobility plays in increasing the
responsiveness of unemployment to a temporary TFP shock. Thus we inter-
act the current and lagged tfp_sh with the proxies of capital mobility. The
interaction term is expected to be negative: the higher the economys level of
capital mobility, the greater the impact of a TFP shock on the unemployment
rate. From Table 4, the interaction terms with both the current and lagged
shock are indeed negative, though not always statistically signicant at con-
ventional levels. The negative e¤ect of capital mobility on the persistence of
unemployment remains negative and signicant.
From a preliminary exploration of our data (paragraph 3) we noticed
that the bivariate relationship between capital mobility and unemployment
volatility appears to have been signicant only since the mid eighties, when
capital ows became more important in the OECD countries. Prior to the
mid 1980s capital ows were much smaller and they were not measured as
accurately as in the more recent period, so it is possible that the earlier mea-
sures are dominated by measurement errors, or that barriers to international
capital mobility render our empirical model inappropriate.
We therefore ask whether the e¤ect of capital mobility on both persistence
and responsiveness of unemployment to TFP shocks is stronger for the years
after 1985. Table 5 presents these results. We interact both the lags of the
unemployment rate and the current and lagged TFP shocks with a period
dummy taking value 1 for years after 1985 and 0 otherwise. We also interact
both the lags of unemployment and current and lagged TFP shock with the
period dummy and the proxies for capital mobility. The coe¢ cients of the
rst set of interactions will capture the e¤ects of any factors at play that
may inuence the persistence and responsiveness of unemployment to TFP
shock between the two periods rather than capital mobility. The coe¢ cients
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Table 4: Capital mobility, unemployment persistence and responsiveness
(whole period)
uit Whole Countries Small Countries
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
uit 1 1.304 1.366 1.349 1.303 1.361 1.354
(21.56) (24.04) (23.22) (18.40) (21.21) (20.43)
uit 2 -0.499 -0.557 -0.540 -0.509 -0.570 -0.560
(8.62) (10.10) (9.95) (7.45) (9.35) (9.24)
uit 1  FDImit 1 0.231 -0.368 -0.425 0.150 -0.370 -0.542
(0.30) (2.23) (1.08) (0.17) (2.20) (1.29)
uit 2  FDImit 1 -0.561 0.257 0.156 -0.543 0.256 0.258
(0.79) (1.57) (0.47) (0.66) (1.49) (0.73)
FDInetit 1 0.010 0.020
(0.49) (0.83)
FDIsumit 1 0.004 0.004
(0.73) (0.69)
FDIinit 1 0.022 0.019
(1.88) (1.45)
FDIoutit 1 -0.004 -0.002
(1.04) (0.72)
unionit 0.034 0.039 0.039 0.034 0.040 0.039
(2.77) (3.22) (3.23) (2.50) (2.86) (2.86)
bdit 0.007 0.008 0.007 0.011 0.011 0.011
(1.63) (1.73) (1.66) (2.05) (2.00) (2.04)
brrit -0.000 -0.002 0.000 -0.006 -0.008 -0.005
(0.05) (0.23) (0.01) (0.54) (0.66) (0.64)
twit 0.026 0.027 0.028 0.044 0.046 0.046
(1.93) (2.05) (2.09) (2.71) (2.75) (2.70)
rintit 0.042 0.041 0.040 0.049 0.050 0.047
(2.17) (2.10) (2.01) (2.16) (2.18) (2.04)
pr_shit 0.004 0.002 0.004 0.007 0.005 0.005
(0.36) (0.17) (0.29) (0.52) (0.32) (0.34)
imp_shit 0.005 0.009 0.013 0.016 0.020 0.025
(0.18) (0.37) (0.49) (0.53) (0.65) (0.80)
tfp_shit -0.061 -0.045 -0.050 -0.051 -0.035 -0.036
(2.93) (2.47) (2.75) (2.26) (1.82) (1.96)
tfp_shit 1 -0.092 -0.086 -0.093 -0.084 -0.082 -0.089
(4.91) (4.57) (5.16) (4.12) (4.13) (4.60)
tfp_shit  FDImit 1 -0.449 -0.007 -0.155 -0.430 -0.017 -0.119
(2.21) (0.12) (1.56) (1.93) (0.32) (1.14)
tfp_shit 1  FDImit 1 -0.039 -0.030 -0.069 -0.024 -0.001 -0.099
(0.18) (0.33) (0.56) (0.10) (0.01) (0.81)
Serial Corr (p-value) 0.34 0.25 0.18 0.19 0.14 0.17
Obs. 544 544 544 361 361 361
Fixed e¤ects 20 20 20 14 14 14
-
F-tests (p-values):
H0 : 
0
1 = 0; 
0
2 = 0 0.27 0.03 0.20 0.29 0.03 0.22
H0 : 
0
1 + 
0
2 = 0 0.09 0.03 0.04 0.08 0.04 0.04
H0 : 
0
1 = 0; 
0
2 = 0 0.08 0.91 0.29 0.13 0.93 0.47
Notes. Robust t-statistics in parenthesis. Serial Correlation is an LM test distributed
N(0,1) under the null (H0: no autocorrelation). In columns (1), (2) and (3) the lags of
the unemployment rate are interacted with FDInet, FDIsum and FDIin respectively.
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of the second set of interactions will capture the additional e¤ect of capital
mobility after 1985.26
The results are consistent with those for the whole period and the coe¢ -
cients are signicant at conventional levels. In particular, capital mobility is
found to signicantly reduce the persistence of unemployment after 1985, the
sum of the FDI interaction terms being negatively signed and statistically
signicant at 10% level and 5% level in all the specications considered. The
fact that some coe¢ cients are jointly but not always individually signicant
and their sum is signicantly negative suggests the presence of some degree
of collinearity. Nevertheless, this still indicates a signicant negative e¤ect
of capital mobility on unemployment persistence.
Turning to the e¤ect of capital mobility on the responsiveness of unem-
ployment to TFP shocks, the coe¢ cients on the capital mobility interactions
are negative, quantitatively important and statistically signicant irrespec-
tively of the proxy of capital mobility used. This result shows that, after
controlling for all the factors driving unemployment, international capital
ows have a positive e¤ect on the responsiveness of unemployment. Consis-
tently with what we found in the preliminary analysis reported in paragraph
3, this e¤ect appears to be stronger after 1985 when the FDI activity is more
quantitatively relevant.
26The specication followed is:
uit =
pX
j=1
(j + 
00
j d85 + 
0
jd85  FDImt 1)uit j
+
qX
j=0
(j + 
00
j d85 + 
0
jd85  FDImit 1)tfp_shit j
+0zit + FDImit 1 +0zit + citt+ t + ci + "it
where d85 = 0 if year 2 [1970; 1985], and d85 = 1 otherwise.
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Table 5: Capital mobility, unemployment persistence and responsiveness af-
ter 1985
uit Whole Countries Small Countries
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
uit 1 1.269 1.293 1.287 1.263 1.289 1.287
(21.79) (21.61) (21.44) (18.26) (18.30) (18.37)
uit 2 -0.374 -0.461 -0.457 -0.432 -0.457 -0.460
(7.68) (7.86) (7.95) (6.29) (6.60) (6.78)
uit 1  d85 0.042 0.054 0.049 0.021 0.025 0.026
(1.08) (1.29) (1.20) (0.60) (0.64) (0.64)
uit 2  d85 -0.097 -0.098 -0.090 -0.083 -0.083 -0.077
(2.67) (2.51) (2.48) (2.45) (2.38) (2.29)
uit 1  d85  FD Imit 1 -0.290 -0.374 -0.428 -0.208 -0.308 -0.460
(0.40) (2.22) (1.11) (0.25) (1.63) (1.10)
uit 2  d85  FD Imit 1 -0.033 0.245 0.113 -0.190 0.174 0.114
(0.05) (1.53) (0.63) (0.24) (0.97) (0.33)
tfp_shit -0.028 -0.030 -0.028 -0.009 -0.010 -0.009
(1.19) (1.35) (1.28) (0.37) (0.67) (0.40)
tfp_shit 1 -0.085 -0.084 -0.085 -0.072 -0.071 -0.072
(4.31) (4.20) (4.16) (3.47) (3.38) (3.43)
tfp_shit  d85 -0.066 -0.031 -0.036 -0.093 -0.051 -0.054
(1.93) (1.03) (1.19) (2.51) (1.54) (1.58)
tfp_shit 1  d85 -0.032 -0.030 -0.029 -0.063 -0.066 -0.066
(0.94) (0.85) (0.85) (1.68) (1.72) (1.93)
tfp_shit  d85  FDImit 1 -0.622 -0.080 -0.212 -0.719 -0.099 -0.210
(2.10) (1.63) (2.11) (3.08) (1.66) (1.93)
tfp_shit 1  d85  FDImit 1 -0.382 -0.104 -0.198 -0.499 -0.185 -0.329
(1.73) (1.12) (1.58) (2.05) (1.95) (2.54)
other controls see appendix Table 4A
Serial Corr (p-value) 0.25 0.22 0.16 0.12 0.11 0.11
Obs. 544 544 544 372 372 372
Fixed e¤ects 20 20 20 14 14 14
F-tests (p-value):
H0 : 
0
1 = 0; 
0
2 = 0 0.14 0.03 0.10 0.31 0.08 0.10
H0 : 
0
1 + 
0
2 = 0 0.08 0.02 0.02 0.08 0.03 0.02
H0 : 
0
1 = 0; 
0
2 = 0 0.00 0.11 0.06 0.00 0.08 0.02
Notes. Robust t-statistics in parenthesis. Serial Correlation is an LM test distributed
N(0,1) under the null (H0: no autocorrelation). In columns (1), (2) and (3) the lags of
the unemployment rate are interacted with FDInet, FDIsum and FDIin respectively. See
Appendix 6.2 for the complete table with the coe¢ cients and t-statistics for the other
controls.
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To conclude, the evidence in Table 5 suggests that countries characterized
by larger penetration of international capital are more responsive to idio-
syncratic TFP shocks and consequently experience amplied uctuations in
employment.
4.3 Simulation: unemployment response to temporary
productivity shocks
In this part of the analysis we illustrate the importance of capital mobility
for the dynamics of unemployment. By using the results from the last set
of regressions (Table 5), we simulate the responsiveness of unemployment
to a (negative) one-standard deviation TFP shock. We trace the response
of unemployment to the TFP shock in a baseline economy with no capital
mobility (closed economy) and we then compare this baseline case with an
economy experiencing positive international capital ows (open economy).
The exercise is repeated for all the three proxies of capital mobility. In order
to quantify the e¤ect of capital mobility on unemployment persistence and
responsiveness in the open economy, we use the sample average of the three
capital mobility indicators in the period 1985-2001, that is FDInet = 0:082,
FDIsum = 0:265 and FDIin = 0:125.
We then make use of the following equations in the simulations:
ut = (1:31  0:29  FDInet)ut 1   (0:47  0:31  FDInet)ut 2 (3)
 (0:09 + 0:32  FDInet)shockt   (0:12 + 0:38  FDInet)shockt 1
+Const1
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Figure 3: Response of unemployment to a TFP shock
ut = (1:35  0:37  FDIsum)ut 1   (0:56  0:25  FDIsum)ut 2 (4)
 (0:06 + 0:08  FDIsum)shockt   (0:11 + 0:10  FDIsum)shockt 1
+Const2
ut = (1:34  0:43  FDIin)ut 1   (0:55  0:11  FDIin)ut 2 (5)
 (0:06 + 0:21  FDIin)shockt   (0:11 + 0:20  FDIin)shockt 1
+Const3
where Consti are constants,by which we mean all variables not varied in
the simulations.
Figure 3 shows the adjustment dynamics of the unemployment rate after
one-standard deviation temporary TFP shock when capital mobility a¤ects
both the persistence and responsiveness of unemployment to a TFP shock.
The initial response of unemployment to the shock is larger in presence of in-
ternational capital mobility, the increase of the unemployment rate being on
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average 0.15 percentage points lower in absence of capital mobility.27 How-
ever, the adjustment to the pre-shock level of unemployment is faster in the
economy with capital mobility because of the lower degree of persistence. In
fact, the estimated mean lag, which gives a summary measure of the speed
of adjustment of unemployment to the productivity shock, is on average 13
percent shorter in the open economy than in the closed economy.28
Figure 4 and Figure 5 show the adjustment of the unemployment rate
to a one-standard deviation temporary TFP shock after separating the two
e¤ects of capital mobility on persistence and responsiveness respectively. It
emerges that international capital movements signicantly amplify the im-
pact on unemployment of temporary shocks (Figure 4) though the duration
of the response is shorter (Figure 5).
Table 6 shows the volatility of the unemployment rate for the period
1986-2001 generated in the previous simulation where the volatility of un-
employment in the economy without capital mobility (closed economy) is
normalized to 1. The results indicate that the simulated standard deviation
of the unemployment rate in the open economy is on average 16 percent
higher than in the economy with no capital mobility.
Finally, in a second simulation we use our empirical model to illustrate
the impact of the observed increase in capital mobility on unemployment
volatility. We repeat the previous exercise for two levels of capital mobil-
ity, before and after 1985. The results are reported in Table 7, where the
simulated volatility of unemployment for the period 1970-1985 is normalized
to 1. Columns 1 and 2 show the simulated volatility of unemployment af-
27The impact coe¢ cient of the productivity shock is on avarage 28 percent higher in the
open economy than in the closed economy.
28The estimated mean lag decreases from 2.1 time-periods (about 25 months) in the
closed economy to 1.8 time-periods (about 21 months) in the open economy.
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Figure 4: Response of unemployment to a TFP shock - E¤ect on responsive-
ness
Figure 5: Response of unemployment to a TFP shock - E¤ect on persistence
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Table 6: Simulated unemployment volatility: 1986-2001
simulated volatility (1986-2001)
closed open
FDIm economy economy
Sim:
FDInet 0.08 1 1.23
FDIsum 0.26 1 1.11
FDIin 0.12 1 1.18
ter 1985 if FDI remained to pre-85 levels and if FDI is allowed to increase
by the observed amount respectively. The table shows that the estimated
contribution29 of the increase in capital mobility to unemployment volatility
(Column 3) varies from about 9 percent when net FDI and FDI inows are
used to almost 13 percent when the other measure is considered30. Over-
all, these estimates suggest that the increase in international capital ows
observed in many OECD countries in the second half of 80s can generate
sizeable increases in the volatility of unemployment.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we presented empirical evidence for the OECD countries to show
that increased international capital mobility has contributed to higher vari-
ance in the unemployment rate. Our ndings conrm that unemployment in
countries characterized by larger penetration of international capital is more
29 The contribution of capital mobility (Column 3) is calculated as the ratio of the
percentage (simulated) variation of volatility induced by the increase in capital mobility
to the total percentage (simulated) increase in volatility between the two periods. For
example for the measure FDInet , the increase in volatility induced by higher international
capital ows is 9.2 percent and the total increase in volatility between the two periods is
77 percent. Therefore, the estimated contribution of capital mobility to the increase of
unemployment volatility is 12 percent.
30Table 5A in Appendix 6.3 reports the contribution of capital mobility to unemployment
volatilty for individual OECD countries.
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Table 7: Capital mobility contribution to variation in unemployment volatil-
ity before and after 1985
unemployment volatility: 1986-2001
simulated
pre-1985 after-1985 cap. mob.
FDI level FDI level contr. (sim)
(1) (2) (3)
Sim:
FDInet 2.05 2.30 0.084
FDIin 1.63 1.75 0.091
FDIsum 1.68 1.90 0.129
Notes. The simulated unemployment volatilities for the period 1970-1985 have been
normalized to one. The contribution of capital mobility (Column 3) is calculated as the
ratio of the percentage (simulated) variation of volatility induced by the increase in capital
mobility to the total percentage (simulated) increase in volatility between the two periods.
responsive to idiosyncratic shocks and consequently these countries experi-
ence amplied uctuations in employment. The time it takes for equilibrium
to be restored, however, is shorter with international capital mobility.
We used our empirical model to simulate the response of the unemploy-
ment rate to a one-standard error temporary TFP shock. The results suggest
that for the period 1986-2001 the simulated unemployment volatility in the
economy with positive international capital mobility is on average 16 percent
higher than in the economy with no capital mobility.
We then used the models estimates to illustrate the extent to which cap-
ital mobility can account for the higher unemployment volatility occurred in
many OECD countries since mid 80s. The model predicts that an increase
of international capital ows of the same magnitude of that observed in the
data after 1985 accounts for 9-13 percent of the (simulated) increase of unem-
ployment volatility. This suggests a signicant role played by international
ows of capital in explaining the rise in unemployment uctuations.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Summary statistics
Table 1A: FDI ows, unemployment and investment volatility: 1970-2001
FDIin FDIout FDIsum FDInet sd_un sd_inv
Australia 0.067 0.029 0.097 0.04 0.010 0.046
Austria 0.034 0.023 0.057 0.016 0.003 0.031
Belgium31 0.178 0.154 0.332 0.068 0.011 0.056
Canada 0.09 0.080 0.171 0.041 0.011 0.045
Denmark 0.106 0.109 0.215 0.035 0.011 0.078
Finland 0.064 0.138 0.202 0.078 0.022 0.082
France 0.058 0.104 0.162 0.051 0.007 0.039
Germany 0.034 0.055 0.089 0.046 0.009 0.029
Ireland 0.166 0.107 0.437 0.222 0.015 0.072
Italy 0.018 0.023 0.041 0.011 0.008 0.033
Japan 0.002 0.021 0.023 0.019 0.002 0.039
Netherlands 0.138 0.220 0.358 0.091 0.012 0.038
New Zealand 0.147 0.043 0.190 0.106 0.010 0.077
Norway 0.051 0.059 0.111 0.037 0.006 0.064
Portugal 0.063 0.037 0.100 0.040 0.012 0.061
Spain 0.071 0.053 0.124 0.051 0.018 0.056
Sweden 0.139 0.157 0.296 0.100 0.012 0.060
Switzerland 0.095 0.223 0.317 0.133 0.008 0.045
United Kingdom 0.124 0.200 0.324 0.089 0.014 0.042
United States 0.042 0.043 0.085 0.023 0.009 0.042
31 Average FDI ows for Belgium are calculated excluding the are calculated excluding
the years 1999 and 2000. Data from the OECD (2003) show that the increase in FDI
activity was largely driven by few M&A transactions foe which were paid exceptional high
prices. This not truly reect the increase in capital mobility.
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Table 2A: FDI inows, unemployment and investment volatility: 1970-1985
FDIin FDIout FDIsum FDInet sd_un sd_inv
Australia 0.046 0.013 0.059 0.036 0.009 0.041
Austria 0.015 0.006 0.021 0.009 0.003 0.041
Belgium 0.062 0.019 0.081 0.045 0.010 0.058
Canada 0.069 0.042 0.111 0.045 0.011 0.044
Denmark 0.007 0.013 0.020 0.0413 0.010 0.087
Finland 0.005 0.012 0.017 0.008 0.010 0.048
France 0.018 0.019 0.037 0.006 0.005 0.036
Germany 0.010 0.023 0.033 0.013 0.010 0.036
Ireland 0.054 - - - 0.016 0.082
Italy 0.012 0.010 0.022 0.007 0.005 0.023
Japan 0.001 0.012 0.012 0.011 0.017 0.044
Netherlands 0.052 0.131 0.183 0.079 0.014 0.044
New Zealand 0.077 0.018 0.096 0.059 0.006 0.085
Norway 0.020 0.022 0.042 0.030 0.003 0.056
Portugal 0.020 0.001 0.022 0.019 0.012 0.076
Spain 0.035 0.006 0.041 0.029 0.013 0.050
Sweden 0.009 0.040 0.048 0.031 0.005 0.029
Switzerland 0.038 0.088 0.126 0.054 0.021 0.054
United Kingdom 0.067 0.102 0.168 0.036 0.013 0.030
United States 0.016 0.027 0.043 0.020 0.011 0.047
Table 3A: FDI inows, unemployment and investment volatility: 1986-2001
FDIin FDIout FDIsum FDInet sd_un sd_inv
Australia 0.090 0.047 0.137 0.045 0.011 0.052
Austria 0.053 0.041 0.093 0.022 0.003 0.017
Belgium 0.270 0.260 0.529 0.086 0.013 0.053
Canada 0.112 0.118 0.230 0.037 0.011 0.046
Denmark 0.162 0.162 0.324 0.047 0.012 0.067
Finland 0.105 0.225 0.329 0.126 0.030 0.107
France 0.085 0.163 0.248 0.082 0.009 0.042
Germany 0.056 0.085 0.141 0.076 0.009 0.022
Ireland 0.250 0.107 0.437 0.222 0.012 0.062
Italy 0.024 0.036 0.061 0.016 0.009 0.042
Japan 0.002 0.026 0.029 0.024 0.003 0.034
Netherlands 0.224 0.308 0.532 0.102 0.009 0.030
New Zealand 0.208 0.064 0.272 0.147 0.013 0.071
Norway 0.073 0.085 0.158 0.042 0.008 0.072
Portugal 0.093 0.061 0.154 0.054 0.012 0.043
Spain 0.095 0.085 0.181 0.066 0.021 0.058
Sweden 0.269 0.275 0.544 0.170 0.016 0.079
Switzerland 0.105 0.248 0.353 0.148 0.011 0.034
United Kingdom 0.181 0.299 0.480 0.142 0.015 0.051
United States 0.068 0.060 0.127 0.025 0.007 0.037
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6.2 Regression tables
Table 4A: Capital mobility, unemployment persistence and responsiveness
before and after 1985
uit Whole Countries Small Countries
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
uit 1 1.269 1.293 1.287 1.263 1.289 1.287
(21.79) (21.61) (21.44) (18.26) (18.30) (18.37)
uit 2 -0.374 -0.461 -0.457 -0.457 -0.457 -0.460
(7.68) (7.86) (7.95) (6.29) (6.60) (6.78)
uit 1  d85 0.042 0.054 0.049 0.021 0.025 0.026
(1.08) (1.29) (1.20) (0.60) (0.64) (0.64)
uit 2  d85 -0.097 -0.098 -0.090 -0.083 -0.083 -0.077
(2.67) (2.51) (2.48) (2.45) (2.38) (2.29)
uit 1  d85  FD Imit 1 -0.290 -0.374 -0.428 -0.208 -0.308 -0.460
(0.40) (2.22) (1.11) (0.25) (1.63) (1.10)
uit 2  d85  FD Imit 1 -0.033 0.245 0.113 0.190 0.174 0.114
(0.05) (1.53) (0.63) (0.24) (0.97) (0.33)
FDInetit 1 0.008 0.021
(0.21) (0.46)
FDInetit 1  d85 -0.005 0.033
(0.05) (0.72)
FDIsumit 1 0.016 -0.001
(0.77) (0.06)
FDIsumit 1  d85 -0.012 0.003
(0.54) (0.12)
FDIinit 1 0.020 -0.012
(0.48) (0.30)
FDIinit 1  d85 0.004 0.035
(0.09) (0.93)
FDIoutit 1 -0.015 -0.013
(0.71) (0.64)
FDIoutit 1  d85 0.011 0.011
(0.59) (0.54)
unionit 0.035 0.041 0.041 0.035 0.043 0.041
(2.83) (3.32) (3.34) (2.61) (3.16) (3.04)
bdit 0.008 0.007 0.008 0.012 0.011 0.011
(1.85) (1.76) (1.80) (2.32) (2.20) (2.21)
brrit 0.003 -0.001 0.003 0.004 -0.001 0.002
(0.30) (0.07) (0.27) (0.32) (0.09) (0.16)
twit 0.027 0.027 0.028 0.046 0.046 0.047
(2.00) (2.04) (2.00) (2.92) (2.75) (2.77)
rintit 0.038 0.039 0.036 0.038 0.042 0.039
(1.97) (1.99) (1.85) (1.75) (1.90) (1.78)
(continued)
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Table 4A (continued)
pr_shit -0.002 0.002 0.003 -0.009 0.003 0.003
(0.13) (0.16) (0.23) (0.37) (0.19) (0.98)
imppr_shit -0.005 0.009 0.023 0.072 0.013 0.029
(0.19) (0.34) (0.80) (3.47) (0.46) (0.98)
tfp_shit -0.028 -0.030 -0.028 -0.093 -0.010 -0.009
(1.19) (1.35) (1.28) (2.51) (0.67) (1.10)
tfp_shit 1 -0.085 -0.084 -0.085 -0.072 -0.071 -0.072
(4.31) (4.20) (4.16) (3.47) (3.38) (3.43)
tfp_shit  d85 -0.032 -0.031 -0.036 -0.093 -0.051 -0.054
(0.94) (1.03) (1.19) (2.51) (1.54) (1.58)
tfp_shit 1  d85 -0.622 -0.030 -0.029 -0.063 -0.066 -0.066
(2.10) (0.85) (0.85) (1.68) (1.72) (1.93)
tfp_shit  d85  FDImit 1 -0.221 -0.080 -0.212 -0.719 -0.099 -0.210
(2.10) (1.63) (2.11) (3.08) (1.66) (1.93)
tfp_shit 1  d85  FDImit 1 -0.382 -0.104 -0.198 -0.499 -0.185 -0.329
(1.73) (1.12) (1.58) (2.05) (1.95) (2.54)
Serial Corr (p-value) 0.25 0.22 0.16 0.12 0.11 0.11
Obs. 544 544 544 372 372 372
Fixed e¤ects 20 20 20 14 14 14
-
F-tests (p-value):
H0 : 
0
1 = 0; 
0
2 = 0 0.14 0.03 0.10 0.31 0.08 0.10
H0 : 
0
1 + 
0
2 = 0 0.08 0.02 0.02 0.08 0.03 0.02
H0 : 
0
1 = 0; 
0
2 = 0 0.00 0.11 0.06 0.00 0.08 0.02
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6.3 Simulation tables
Table 5A: Capital mobility contribution to variation in unemployment volatil-
ity before and after 1985
unemployment volatility: 1986-2001
simulated
pre-1985 after-1985 cap. mob.
FDI level FDI level contr. (sim)
(1) (2) (3)
Sim:
Australia FDInet 2.07 2.12 0.022
FDIsum 1.62 1.68 0.054
FDIin 1.72 1.82 0.071
Austria FDInet 1.93 2.00 0.036
FDIsum 1.59 1.65 0.058
FDIin 1.65 1.74 0.074
Belgium FDInet 2.12 2.31 0.068
FDIsum 1.76 1.88 0.077
FDIin 1.59 2.17 0.312
Canada FDInet 2.12 2.08 -0.017
FDIsum 1.66 1.73 0.058
FDIin 1.77 1.87 0.065
Denmark FDInet 1.96 2.13 0.078
FDIsum 1.59 1.79 0.159
FDIin 1.63 1.97 0.215
Finland FDInet 1.93 2.50 0.197
FDIsum 1.59 1.79 0.159
FDIin 1.63 1.85 0.159
France FDInet 1.92 2.29 0.149
FDIsum 1.61 1.74 0.109
FDIin 1.65 1.74 0.074
Germany FDInet 1.96 2.67 0.217
FDIsum 1.60 1.68 0.074
FDIin 1.63 1.81 0.136
Ireland FDInet - - -
FDIsum - - -
FDIin 1.74 2.13 0.198
Italy FDInet 1.93 1.97 0.021
FDIsum 1.59 1.62 0.030
FDIin 1.64 1.67 0.027
Japan FDInet 1.95 2.01 0.030
FDIsum 1.59 1.60 0.010
FDIin 1.61 1.61 0.000
(continued)
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Table 5A (continued)
Sim:
Netherlands FDInet 2.28 2.38 0.032
FDIsum 1.65 1.89 0.163
FDIin 1.73 2.09 0.191
New Zealand FDInet 2.18 2.59 0.118
FDIsum 1.65 1.76 0.088
FDIin 1.79 2.06 0.142
Norway FDInet 2.04 2.10 0.027
FDIsum 1.61 1.69 0.072
FDIin 1.66 1.78 0.093
Portugal FDInet 1.89 2.16 0.123
FDIsum 1.60 1.69 0.082
FDIin 1.66 1.78 0.093
Spain FDInet 2.04 2.22 0.072
FDIsum 1.61 1.70 0.080
FDIin 1.69 1.82 0.094
Sweden FDInet 2.05 262 0.172
FDIsum 1.61 1.89 0.195
FDIin 1.63 2.17 0.283
Switzerland FDInet 2.16 2.59 0.125
FDIsum 1.67 1.80 0.097
FDIin 1.70 1.85 0.104
UK FDInet 2.07 2.57 0.154
FDIsum 1.69 1.86 0.117
FDIin 1.77 2.00 0.130
US FDInet 1.99 2.02 0.015
FDIsum 1.61 1.67 0.056
FDIin 1.65 1.77 0.094
Average FDInet 2.05 2.30 0.084
FDIsum 1.63 1.75 0.091
FDIin 1.68 1.90 0.129
Notes. Both actual and simulated unemployment volatilities have been normalized to one
for the period 1970-1985.
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6.4 Data appendix
6.4.1 Sample composition
The countries in the sample are:
Australia Finland Japan Spain
Austria France Netherlands Sweden
Belgium Germany Norway Switzerland
Canada Ireland New Zealand United Kingdom
Denmark Italy Portugal United States
6.4.2 Data denitions and sources
u Unemployment rate (source: OECD Economic Outlook).
sd_un Unemployment rate volatility. This is calculated as the standard devia-
tion of the cyclical component of the unemployment rate. We detrended
the data using the Hodrick-Prescott lter, setting the smoothing pa-
rameter  equal to 100 as suggested for annual data (Hodrick and
Prescott, 1997).
sd_inv Investment rate volatility where the investment rate is dened as the
ratio of real investment to real GDP (source: OECD National Ac-
counts). Volatility is calculated as the standard deviation of the cycli-
cal component of the investment rate. We detrended the data using
the Hodrick-Prescott lter, setting the smoothing parameter  equal
to 100 as suggested for annual data (Hodrick and Prescott, 1997).
FDIin Foreign direct investment inows (source: International Financial Sta-
tistics, IMF) normalized to nominal domestic investment (source: OECD
National Accounts).
FDIout Foreign direct investment outows (source: International Financial
Statistics, IMF) normalized to nominal domestic investment (source:
OECD National Accounts).
FDInet Net foreign direct investment ows: FDInet = jFDIin  FDIoutj :
FDIsum Sum of foreign direct investment inows and outows: FDIsum =
FDIin+ FDIout:
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w Real labour cost: w =

WSSE
defGDP

=(L   Lself ), where WSSE is the
compensation of employees at current price and national currencies
(source: OECD Economic Outlook), defGDP is the GDP deator, base
year 1990 (source: OECD National Accounts), L is total employment
and Lself is the total number of self- employed (source: OECD National
Accounts).
K Real capital stock. The calculation of the capital stock is made accord-
ing to the Perpetual InventoryMethod: K = (1 )K 1+

In
defINV

 1
,
where In is the gross xed capital formation at current prices and na-
tional currencies (source: OECD National Accounts) and defINV is
the gross xed capital formation price index, base year 1990 (source:
OECDNational Accounts) and the depreciation rate, , is assumed con-
stant and equal to 8 percent, which is consistent with OECD estimates
(Machin and Van Reenen, 1998). Initial capital stock is calculated as:
K0 =
I0
g + 
, where g is the average annual growth of investment ex-
penditure and I0 is investment expenditure in the rst year for which
data is available.
tfp_sh TFP shock. This is computed as the deviation of the Solow resid-
ual from its (Hodrick-Prescott) trend (Nickell et al. 2001). The Solow
residual is calculated using the following formula: dlnA =
1
1   [d lnY 
d lnK   (1  )d lnL], where Y is gross domestic output at constant
price and national currencies (source: OECD National Accounts), K is
capital stock as dened above, L is total employment (source: OECD
Economic Outlook), (1   ) is a smoothed share of labour following
the procedure described in Harrigan (1997). Labor share is dened as
(1  ) = wL
Y
.
p Consumer price index , base year 1990 (OECD, Main Economic Indi-
cators).
pr_sh Price shock. This is computed as the change in ination: pr_sh = 2p
imp_sh Import price shock. This is measured by proportional changes in
real import prices weighted by the trade share (Nickell et al. 2001):
imp_sh =
M
Yn
 ln

PM
PY

where M (source: OECD Outlook) and Yn
(source: OECD National Accounts) are imports and GDP at current
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prices, PM (source: OECD Outlook) and PY (source: OECD National
Accounts) are the import price deator and the GDP deator (source:
OECD National Accounts) both with 1995 as base year .
rint Real long term interest rate deated by the 3-year expected ination
rate: r = i E(d ln p+1), where i is the long term nominal interest rate
(source: OECD Economic Outlook). E(d ln p+1) are tted values from
the regression d ln p = 1d ln p 1 + 2d ln p 2 + 3d ln p 3 + , where
d ln p is the ination rate based on the consumer price index p (source:
OECD National Accounts) and the coe¢ cients on the right side are
restricted to sum to one, indicating ination neutrality in the long run
(see Cristini, 1999).
union Net union density, dened as the percentage of employees who are
union members (source: Nickell et al. 2001). For the years after 1995
the series has been updated using the new data in Visser (2000) and
national sources.
tw Tax wedge, calculated as the sum of the employment tax rate, the direct
tax rate and the indirect tax rate (source: Nickell et al. 2001). Updated
series for the years after 1995 are obtained from the OECD. When
necessary, we extrapolated the series for the period 1999-2001.
br Benet replacement ratio, dened as the ratio of unemployment ben-
ets to wages for a number of representative types (source: Nickell et
al. 2001, constructed from OECD data sources). Updated series for
the years after 1995 are obtained from the OECD. When necessary, we
extrapolated the series for the period 1999-2001.
bd Benet duration, dened as a weighted average of benets received
during the second, third, fourth and fth year of unemployment divided
by the benets in the rst year of unemployment (source: Nickell et
al. 2001, constructed form OECD data source). Updated series for
the years after 1995 are obtained from the OECD. When necessary, we
extrapolated the series for the period 1999-2001.
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